Showing posts with label justice. Show all posts
Showing posts with label justice. Show all posts

Sunday, February 10, 2013

Guardians and Unjust Justice

  
     Plato's attempt at making a beautiful city in The Republic is very commendable. His city has some good qualities, but most of them are bad. For instance, he (not to be anachronistic here) has a very Bolshevik-esque method of controlling what people learn from reading and hearing stories. While some form of censorship is appropriate and necessary, his seems to be a bit overkill. His can be summed up as:



      There are also prostitutes, communally shared wives, and pastries (and we know that sugary goodness is evil), but removing some of these things might actually make his city a good place.
I also really like what he says about the guardians and the judges not necessarily being happy. Happiness in a position of power may distract from the gravity of the position. It follows, then, that governance should look less like this



and more like this



      Speaking of the guardians, let's look at his method of raising them: “We must keep them under observation from childhood . . . and we must select whoever keeps on remembering it and isn't easily deceived” (413c-413d). Am I the only one who thinks this is a little bit creepy? It bears a striking resemblance to the kind of population control we (will) see in (SPOILERS!) Huxley's Brave New World.

       I also really enjoyed Plato's summary of wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice. I was surprised to see his definition of courage as a sort of preservation of the city and its institutions, especially because he seems to lean toward the idea in his Laches that courage is a form of endurance. The more I think about it, though, the more preservation of the city's institutions seems to be a form of endurance. He's relatively consistent to say the least.

      I think my biggest issue comes from his definition of justice as being a sort of refusal to meddle in affairs or duties that are not one's own (434c); furthermore, he asserts that an individual who is just is also wise, courageous, and moderate in his indulgences (442d).
      Here, his logic is fallacious because his definition of justice doesn't coincide with the other three qualities from which it's derived. I'm training to be a teacher in Maryland, so let's use that as an example. I will be obligated to report any suspected cases of a parent abusing his or her child. That's the right thing to do, ergo it's just, which means the deed is justice. Obviously, reporting such an incident would be wise (to prevent further injury) and courageous (because it's a tough decision to make, especially if one turns out to be wrong). According to Plato, both of these categories factor into justice, but the action wouldn't be justice because it would be meddling, which is unjust. Yeah, right...


(Meme taken from mybroadband.co.za. Crowdsurfing photo taken from blog.gotoohlala.com. Burden sketch taken from jonathanmetz.com).